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13 December 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Department review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 December 1960

DAILY BRIEF

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algeria-France: Violent Moslem demonstrations, which entered their third day on 12 December, have brought strong repressive measures from the French Army. De Gaulle's decision to return to Paris a day earlier than planned may have been based on his view that his continued presence in Algeria would only encourage further Moslem-European clashes. Reports of an imminent emergency cabinet meeting, however, suggest new moves from Paris.

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Congo: Despite the position taken by Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Morocco, Guinea, and the UAR to withdraw their troops from the Congo, Prime Minister Nehru is firmly resisting pressure from most of his cabinet and other influential Indians for a withdrawal of Indian officials and military units from the UN Congo operation. He remains convinced that the UN offers the only hope for preventing "another Korea," and feels its present untenable position must be strengthened immediately. New Delhi has instructed its embassy in Cairo to protest against UAR press criticism of the alleged partisan attitude of Indian

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representatives in the Congo.

The situation in the Stanleyville area remains tense, and Mobutu's delay in initiating military operations against pro-Lumumba forces there has aroused criticism from the commissioners general in Leopoldville who have been handling government affairs as technicians on an interim basis. The commissioners are reported also concerned over the condition of some government troops who lack sufficient ammunition, food, and transportation.

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	111. THE WEST	25X1
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	Ecuador-Czechessovakia: Foreign Minister Chiriboga has	
	Consounced that a Czech is ation will be opened in Quito shortly und that Ecuador will establish a diplomatic mission of the same rank in Prague next January. The former Ponce regime or-dered the closure in September 1957 of the Czech legation the only bloc mission in Quitowithout severing relations, but	
	weeks before the new administration was inaugurated on I Septomber. The leftist Ecuadorean minister of education recently returned from Presse where he entered into a preliminary agree.	EGIB
	ment to purchase about \$630,000 in technical equipment for schools	25X1
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25X1	and received a Czech offer to provide a \$10,000,000 loan. Although the repoening of the Czech mission in Quito may be a normal outgrowth of these recent economic and diplomatic moves, it appears timed to reinforce the threats of President Velasco, Chiriboga, and other top officials to turn to the bloc and Cuba to win support for Ecuador's concerted campaign to nullify the Rio Protocol. The protocol provides for the definitive settlement of the long-standing boundary dispute with Peru and grants a favorable territorial award to the latter.	25X1

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The Algerian Situation

Moslem demonstrations in Algiers entered their third day on 12 December as French troops fired on a mob attempting to leave the Moslem quarter, killing at least six. Moslem civilians in the city are becoming more open in their support of the rebel National Revolutionary Front (FLN). The vehemence of the Moslem demonstrations undercuts the settler claim that the Moslems want to remain French, and the efforts of the colons to retain a privileged position are likely to become more desperate.

De Gaulle's decision to return to Paris on 13 December--a day early--may have been based on a view that his continued presence in Algeria would only encourage further clashes between Moslems and Europeans and lead to further setbacks to his program for an amicable settlement on the basis of an "Algerian Algeria." Reports of an emergency cabinet meeting on his return suggest possible new moves from Paris. The Moslem-European clashes, absent in both the 1958 and January 1960 Algerian upheavals, will sharply increase left and center pressure in France for an accommodation with Moslem Algerians. However, the clashes may already have rendered a solution based on cooperative communities of Europeans and Moslems almost impossible.

The disturbances in Algeria are taking place at a moment when leaders of the FLN's military forces reportedly are planning a period of reduced activity in Algeria in order to familiarize their troops in Tunisia and Morocco with arms received from the Sino-Soviet bloc. In an effort to acquire greater respectability on the "day of victory," the rebels reportedly are also planning the creation of a tightly disciplined 2,000-man contingent which would be withheld from the present loosely organized guerrilla bands and would serve as a nucleus for an army of an independent Algeria.

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Nehru Resists Pressure for Indian Withdrawal from Congo

reason that Lumumba is on the way out and continued UN and Indian presence in the Congo can only perpetuate a regime identified strongly with the Western powers. Nehru reportedly has refused to change his stand, perhaps in part as a result of UN delegation leader Krishna Menon's urgent recommendation against withdrawal. Referring to the decisions of other nations to withdraw their forcesnow including Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Morocco, Guinea, and the UAR-the prime minister stated on 12 December that a UN withdrawal from the Congo would lead to "complete chaos and perhaps a major war in Africa, and accordingly India will not pull out." Nehru warned Ambassador Bunker on 8 December, however, that the UN would have to get out of the Congo if its present weak position were not strengthened immediately. Further incidents involving Indian nationals would make it far more difficult for Nehru to resist pressure for withdrawal. New Delhi recently instructed its embassy in Cairo to protest against UAR press criticism of the allegedly partisan attitude of Indian representatives in the Congo. The Ceylonese Government has announced that it will reconsider its decision to withdraw the small Ceylonese administrative contingent so long as the UN continues to uphold the legal authority of the	Prime Minister Nehru is being subjected to growing pressure from most of his cabinet colleagues to withdraw Indian officials and military units from the UN Congo operation. He remains convinced, however, that the UN offers the only hope for preventing "another Korea" and that India must continue its supporting role in the Congo. reportedly have argued that the Indian military and medical missions, as well as UN Representative Dayal, should be withdrawn because their preence implies support for Lumumba's authority and conse-
Continued UN and Indian presence in the Congo can only perpetuate a regime identified strongly with the Western powers. Nehru reportedly has refused to change his stand, perhaps in part as a result of UN delegation leader Krishna Menon's urgent recommendation against withdrawal. Referring to the decisions of other nations to withdraw their forcesnow including Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Morocco, Guinea, and the UAR-the prime minister stated on 12 December that a UN withdrawal from the Congo would lead to "complete chaos and perhaps a major war in Africa, and accordingly India will not pull out." Nehru warned Ambassador Bunker on 8 December, however, that the UN would have to get out of the Congo if its present weak position were not strengthened immediately. Further incidents involving Indian nationals would make it far more difficult for Nehru to resist pressure for withdrawal. New Delhi recently instructed its embassy in Cairo to protest against UAR press criticism of the allegedly partisan attitude of Indian representatives in the Congo. The Ceylonese Government has announced that it will reconsider its decision to withdraw the small Ceylonese administrative contingent so	quently may antagonize the incoming US administration.
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Lumumba government. The Indonesian Government declared on 10 December that it would recall its 1,150-man force because Djakarta feels the UN is unable to carry out its assigned task, although the Indonesian foreign minister has privately indicated that this decision is subject to change.

The long-awaited visit of the UN's Conciliation Commission to the Congo is about to occur, although present plans call for an advance party of only three officers, led by Nigeria's representative Wachuku, to depart for Leopoldville on 13 December. The remaining members of the commission are to proceed only when so advised by Wachuku,

In Leopoldville Colonel Mobutu reportedly was criticized at a recent meeting of the commissioners, who are concerned over the low morale and generally bad situation of the Congolese National Army. The commissioners are worried over the condition of the troops in Luluabourg and Stanleyville, where there reportedly is not enough ammunition, food, or transport. Morale in the regular army is bad because of Mobutu's special attention to organizing a paratroop force. The Leopoldville commissioners are also dissatisfied with the delay in military operations against Stanleyville. An uneasy peace prevails in Stanleyville, but at any time the pro-Lumumba leaders and troops may engage in further harassment of Europeans. Within the past few days Ethiopian troops of the UN command have helped evacuate some 35 Europeans from the hinterland of Orientale Province

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